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N.: Arrest--Mistaken Identity--Liability of Officer Without Warrant A

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ARREST - MISTAKEN IDENTITY - LIABILITY OF OFFICER WITHOUT WARRANT ATTEMPTING TO APPREHEND KNoWN FELON. -A

felony had been committed at night and X, the known felon, had
fled. D, a constable, acting without a warrant, took up the search
for the felon whose identity was known to him and, still at night,
and within one-half mile of the scene of the felony encountered P;
upon P's taking flight D under the mistaken belief that P was the
felon fired at and wounded P, an innocent man.1 Held, that an
instruction, that if D had reasonable grounds for believing that P
was the fleeing felon and that it was necessary to shoot in order to
prevent an escape such belief would require a verdict for D, was
properly refused and that D was liable on his bond 2 for the injury
inflicted. State v. Day.'
The problem presented by the instant case, i. e., the relative
importance of encouraging attempts to apprehend supposed law
violators as contrasted with that of affording personal security to
the individual, is of no slight public importance. It is well-established law that for misdemeanors an officer acts at his peril in
arresting or attempting to arrest and is liable for harm done to
one mistaken for the person sought. 4 Likewise, courts almost uniformly have held that where an officer holds a warrant for one
charged with a felony and by mistake arrests another, one not
named in the warrant, the officer must respond in damages for his
mistake in identity,5 irrespective of how reasonable the officer's

I The felony was murder, later confessed as such by a plea of guilty to second
degree. That the officer was acting without a warrant and that the felon was
known to the officer at the time of the attempted arrest is not set forth in the
report of the case. This supplementary information was gained from counsels'
briefs; it is included here for any significance that it may have.
2"W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 6, art. 2, § 10, prescribes official bond.
Standard Rate Manual, Fidelity, Forgery and Security Bonds, W. Va., Oct.
1932, lists premiums per thousand per annum on peace officers' official bonds:
constable, $10; deputy constable, $10; town marshall, $5; policeman, $5;
sheriff, $7.50; deputy sheriff, $7.50.
The bonding company paying a judgment returned against an officer's bond
seems to have a right of subrogation against the officer. See Woodyard v.
Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689 (1922); Myers v. Miller, 45 W. Va. 595,
31 S. E. 976 (1898).
3 198 S. E. 609 (W. Va. 1938).
4 State v. Cunningham, 113 W. Va. 244, 167 S. B. 595 (1933); Gold v.
Armer, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1069, 140 App. Div. 73 (1911); Price v. Tehan, 84
Conn. 164, 79 Atl. 68 (1911) ; Note (1911) 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1182; HARPR,
LAW OF ToRTs (1933) § 55.
r Johnson v. Williams, 111 Ky. 289, 63 S. W. 759 (1901); West v. Cabell,
153 U. S. 78 (1894); Hays v. Creary, 60 Tex. 445 (1883); Griswold v. Sedgwick, 6 Cow. 460 (N. Y. 1826).
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belief in the matter may have been,' even though the arrested person be of the same name7 or description s as the one designated in
the warrant, 9 so long as the person arrested has not misled the officer by word or conduct.1
On the other hand- standing as what seems to be almost a
paradoxical doctrine11 - at common law an officer, without a warrant, is privileged to arrest one whom he reasonably suspects to be
a felon ;12 the officer may employ an amount of force reasonably
necessary to effect the arrest, provided that deadly force may be
resorted to only in case the felony is one that "normally causes or
threatens death or serious bodily harm", 13 and no liability attaches
to the officer's conduct under such circumstances, even though the
person arrested be innocent.. 4
The present case embraces elements of both the strict rule of
liability for mistaken identity and that of privileged discretion, as
to the person to be arrested and the amouht of force to be employed,
accorded an officer acting without a warrant and upon reasonable
suspicion only. The decision of the instant case expressly refuses to
admit any distinction between the right to arrest for a misdemeanor and the right to arrest for a felony as being decisive. By
implication, moreover, it holds that whether the officer acted with
or without a warrant at the time of the attempted arrest is immaterial. The instant case in both its express holding and in its
further implications seems to be in accord with the general tenor

6 Johnson v. Williams, 111 Ky. 289, 63 S. W. 759 (1901); Holmes v. Blylor,
80 Iowa 365, 45 S. W. 756 (1890); Formwalt v. Hylton, 66 Tex. 288, 1 S. W.
376 (1886). Contra: Kopplekom v. Huffman, 12 Neb. 95, 10 S. W. 577 (1881).
7Clark v. Winn, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 46 S. W. 915 (1898).
s Holmes v. Blyler, 80 Iowa 365, 45 S. W. 756 (1890); Clark v. Winn, 19
Tex. Civ. App. 223, 46 S. W. 915 (1898).
9 Reasonable belief may be considered in reduction of damages. Landrum
v. Wells, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 625, 26 S. W. 1001 (1894); HARPER, LAW OF ToRTS

§ 23.

10 Hays v. Creary, 60 Tex. 445 (1883); POLLooK, LAW OF ToRTs (12th ed.
1923) 121, 122.
11 See Whittier, Mitake in the Law of Torts (1902) 15 HARv. L. REV. 335,
341.
12RESTATEMENT, ToaTs (1934) § 121.
Bourne v. Richardson, 133 Va. 441,
113 S. E. 893 (1923); Rohan v. Swain, 5 Cush. 281 (Mass. 1849).
'3 Caldeen v. Reid, 107 Wash. 508, 182 Pac. 599 (1919) ; Storey v. State, 71
Ala. 329, 339-340 (1882), quoted from RESTATEMENT, ToaTs § 131; HARPER,
LAw oF ToaTs § 55.
14 Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56, 19 Am. Rep. 669 (1874) ; Carr v. State, 43
Ark. 99 (1884) syl. 7.
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of the law"5 and carries to a logical conclusion the principle of
liability for an officer's mistake in identity in making an arrest.

W. E. N.
INSURANC]--AcCIDENT POLICY - TOTAL DisAwBITY AS ExCUSE FOR

FAILURE TO FmE NOTICE AND PROOFS

OF Loss.'

-

D is-

sued a life insurance policy to P which included a clause for indemnity for disability, and also a rider providing for double indemnity. P was injured in an automobile accident and rendered
physically and mentally disabled for about ninety-seven days thereafter. The indemnity provisions were to the effect that notice of
disability and proofs of loss should be filed within sixty days after
disability. Because of his condition, P did not file notices and
proofs within the time stipulated and D set this up as a defense to
P's action on the policy. After judgment on the verdict for P, D
obtained a writ of error. Held, that such disability of the insured
was an excuse for the failure to fie the notice and proofs of loss
within the time provided in the accident and disability clause of
the policy, and that the insurer was liable since notice and proofs
were filed within a reasonable time after recovery. Neill v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Insurance Company.Though there is respectable authority the other way,' this rule
of law has been generally accepted as the better doctrine in such
cases.4 The rule is based on a variety of grounds, among others,
that the insurance contract is one of adhesion and calls for a liberal

'15Vice v. Holly, 88 Miss. 572, 41 So. 7 (1906) ; Formwalt v. Hylton, 66 Tex.
288, 1 S. W. 376 (1886); POLLOCK, LAv Or TORTs 121-122; COOLEY, ToRTs
(3d ed. 1906) 316; but see Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N. W. 999 (1893).
1 For a more complete discussion of the principles involved in this subject,
see Raymond, Physical or Mental Incapacity as an Excuse for Failure to Give
Notice of Accident or Mak~e Proof of Disability Required by Provisions of Accident and Life Insurance Policies (1938) 5 INSURANCE CoUNsEL JOURNAL,
number 2, p. 15.
2 195 S. E. 860 (W. Va. 1938), Hatcher, J., dissenting.
3 Egan v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 60 F. (2d) 268 (N. D. Ga. 1932) ; Whiteside v.
North American Accident Ins. Co., 200 N. Y. 320, 93 N. E. 498, 35 L. R. A,
(. S.) 696 (1911).
Haymond, supran. 1; 33 C. J. 15; Note (1916) 14 R. C. L. 1333: 'Failure
to give notice is excused where the insured was disabled by an accident insured
against to give the required notice, according to some courts, though good
authority eists for the proposition that an insured is not relieved from the
obligation imposed upon him by the terms of his policy to give notice, by himself or his representative, within a certain time of the commencement of his
illness, by the fact that his illness is such as to render him delirious and unable
to remember that he has the policy.")
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